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Appendix E Wireless LANs
IEEE 802.1x
In June 2001, the IEEE 802.1x standard was designed to extend the features of IEEE 802.11 to
support extended authentication as well as providing additional accounting and control
features. It is supported by Windows XP and a number of network devices. Some advantages
of IEEE 802.1x are:
User based identification that allows for roaming.
Support for RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial In User Service, RFC 2138, 2139) for
centralized user profile and accounting management on a network RADIUS server.
Support for EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol, RFC 2486) that allows additional
authentication methods to be deployed with no changes to the access point or the wireless
stations.
RADIUS
RADIUS is based on a client-server model that supports authentication, authorization and
accounting. The access point is the client and the server is the RADIUS server. The RADIUS
server handles the following tasks:
• Authentication
Determines the identity of the users.
• Authorization
Determines the network services available to authenticated users once they are connected
to the network.
• Accounting
Keeps track of the client’s network activity.
RADIUS is a simple package exchange in which your AP acts as a message relay between the
wireless station and the network RADIUS server.
Types of RADIUS Messages
The following types of RADIUS messages are exchanged between the access point and the
RADIUS server for user authentication:
• Access-Request
Sent by an access point requesting authentication.
• Access-Reject
Sent by a RADIUS server rejecting access.
• Access-Accept
Sent by a RADIUS server allowing access.
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• Access-Challenge
Sent by a RADIUS server requesting more information in order to allow access. The
access point sends a proper response from the user and then sends another Access-
Request message.
The following types of RADIUS messages are exchanged between the access point and the
RADIUS server for user accounting:
• Accounting-Request
Sent by the access point requesting accounting.
• Accounting-Response
Sent by the RADIUS server to indicate that it has started or stopped accounting.
In order to ensure network security, the access point and the RADIUS server use a shared
secret key, which is a password, they both know. The key is not sent over the network. In
addition to the shared key, password information exchanged is also encrypted to protect the
network from unauthorized access.
Types of Authentication
This appendix discusses some popular authentication types:
EAP-MD5
,
EAP-TLS
,
EAP-
TTLS
,
PEAP
and
LEAP
.
The type of authentication you use depends on the RADIUS server or the AP. Consult your
network administrator for more information.
EAP-MD5 (Message-Digest Algorithm 5)
MD5 authentication is the simplest one-way authentication method. The authentication server
sends a challenge to the wireless station. The wireless station ‘proves’ that it knows the
password by encrypting the password with the challenge and sends back the information.
Password is not sent in plain text.
However, MD5 authentication has some weaknesses. Since the authentication server needs to
get the plaintext passwords, the passwords must be stored. Thus someone other than the
authentication server may access the password file. In addition, it is possible to impersonate an
authentication server as MD5 authentication method does not perform mutual authentication.
Finally, MD5 authentication method does not support data encryption with dynamic session
key. You must configure WEP encryption keys for data encryption.
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Appendix E Wireless LANs
EAP-TLS (Transport Layer Security)
With EAP-TLS, digital certifications are needed by both the server and the wireless stations
for mutual authentication. The server presents a certificate to the client. After validating the
identity of the server, the client sends a different certificate to the server. The exchange of
certificates is done in the open before a secured tunnel is created. This makes user identity
vulnerable to passive attacks. A digital certificate is an electronic ID card that authenticates the
sender’s identity. However, to implement EAP-TLS, you need a Certificate Authority (CA) to
handle certificates, which imposes a management overhead.
EAP-TTLS (Tunneled Transport Layer Service)
EAP-TTLS is an extension of the EAP-TLS authentication that uses certificates for only the
server-side authentications to establish a secure connection. Client authentication is then done
by sending username and password through the secure connection, thus client identity is
protected. For client authentication, EAP-TTLS supports EAP methods and legacy
authentication methods such as PAP, CHAP, MS-CHAP and MS-CHAP v2.
PEAP (Protected EAP)
Like EAP-TTLS, server-side certificate authentication is used to establish a secure connection,
then use simple username and password methods through the secured connection to
authenticate the clients, thus hiding client identity. However, PEAP only supports EAP
methods, such as EAP-MD5, EAP-MSCHAPv2 and EAP-GTC (EAP-Generic Token Card),
for client authentication. EAP-GTC is implemented only by Cisco.
LEAP
LEAP (Lightweight Extensible Authentication Protocol) is a Cisco implementation of IEEE
802.1x.
Dynamic WEP Key Exchange
The AP maps a unique key that is generated with the RADIUS server. This key expires when
the wireless connection times out, disconnects or reauthentication times out. A new WEP key
is generated each time reauthentication is performed.
If this feature is enabled, it is not necessary to configure a default encryption key in the
Wireless screen. You may still configure and store keys here, but they will not be used while
Dynamic WEP is enabled.
Note:
EAP-MD5 cannot be used with Dynamic WEP Key Exchange
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For added security, certificate-based authentications (EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS and PEAP) use
dynamic keys for data encryption. They are often deployed in corporate environments, but for
public deployment, a simple user name and password pair is more practical. The following
table is a comparison of the features of authentication types.
WPA
User Authentication
WPA applies IEEE 802.1x and Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) to authenticate
wireless stations using an external RADIUS database.
Encryption
WPA improves data encryption by using Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) or
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Message Integrity Check (MIC) and IEEE 802.1x.
TKIP uses 128-bit keys that are dynamically generated and distributed by the authentication
server. It includes a per-packet key mixing function, a Message Integrity Check (MIC) named
Michael, an extended initialization vector (IV) with sequencing rules, and a re-keying
mechanism.
TKIP regularly changes and rotates the encryption keys so that the same encryption key is
never used twice.
The RADIUS server distributes a Pairwise Master Key (PMK) key to the AP that then sets up
a key hierarchy and management system, using the PMK to dynamically generate unique data
encryption keys to encrypt every data packet that is wirelessly communicated between the AP
and the wireless stations. This all happens in the background automatically.
AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) also uses a secret key. This implementation of AES
applies a 128-bit key to 128-bit blocks of data.
Table 148
Comparison of EAP Authentication Types
EAP-MD5
EAP-TLS
EAP-TTLS
PEAP
LEAP
Mutual Authentication
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Certificate – Client
No
Yes
Optional
Optional
No
Certificate – Server
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Dynamic Key Exchange
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Credential Integrity
None
Strong
Strong
Strong
Moderate
Deployment Difficulty
Easy
Hard
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Client Identity Protection
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
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Appendix E Wireless LANs
The Message Integrity Check (MIC) is designed to prevent an attacker from capturing data
packets, altering them and resending them. The MIC provides a strong mathematical function
in which the receiver and the transmitter each compute and then compare the MIC. If they do
not match, it is assumed that the data has been tampered with and the packet is dropped.
By generating unique data encryption keys for every data packet and by creating an integrity
checking mechanism (MIC), TKIP makes it much more difficult to decrypt data on a Wi-Fi
network than WEP, making it difficult for an intruder to break into the network.
The encryption mechanisms used for WPA and WPA-PSK are the same. The only difference
between the two is that WPA-PSK uses a simple common password, instead of user-specific
credentials. The common-password approach makes WPA-PSK susceptible to brute-force
password-guessing attacks but it’s still an improvement over WEP as it employs an easier-to-
use, consistent, single, alphanumeric password.
Security Parameters Summary
Refer to this table to see what other security parameters you should configure for each
Authentication Method/ key management protocol type. MAC address filters are not
dependent on how you configure these security features.
Table 149
Wireless Security Relational Matrix
AUTHENTICATION
METHOD/ KEY
MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
ENCRYPTION
METHOD
ENTER
MANUAL KEY
ENABLE IEEE 802.1X
Open
None
No
No
Open
WEP
No
Enable with Dynamic WEP Key
Yes
Enable without Dynamic WEP Key
Yes
Disable
Shared
WEP
No
Enable with Dynamic WEP Key
Yes
Enable without Dynamic WEP Key
Yes
Disable
WPA
WEP
No
Yes
WPA
TKIP
No
Yes
WPA-PSK
WEP
Yes
Yes
WPA-PSK
TKIP
Yes
Yes

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