Page 226 / 252 Scroll up to view Page 221 - 225
Appendix D Wireless LANs
NBG5715 User’s Guide
226
Figure 138
RTS/CTS
When station
A
sends data to the AP, it might not know that the station
B
is already using the
channel. If these two stations send data at the same time, collisions may occur when both sets of
data arrive at the AP at the same time, resulting in a loss of messages for both stations.
RTS/CTS
is designed to prevent collisions due to hidden nodes. An
RTS/CTS
defines the biggest
size data frame you can send before an RTS (Request To Send)/CTS (Clear to Send) handshake is
invoked.
When a data frame exceeds the
RTS/CTS
value you set (between 0 to 2432 bytes), the station
that wants to transmit this frame must first send an RTS (Request To Send) message to the AP for
permission to send it. The AP then responds with a CTS (Clear to Send) message to all other
stations within its range to notify them to defer their transmission. It also reserves and confirms
with the requesting station the time frame for the requested transmission.
Stations can send frames smaller than the specified
RTS/CTS
directly to the AP without the RTS
(Request To Send)/CTS (Clear to Send) handshake.
You should only configure
RTS/CTS
if the possibility of hidden nodes exists on your network and
the "cost" of resending large frames is more than the extra network overhead involved in the RTS
(Request To Send)/CTS (Clear to Send) handshake.
If the
RTS/CTS
value is greater than the
Fragmentation Threshold
value (see next), then the
RTS (Request To Send)/CTS (Clear to Send) handshake will never occur as data frames will be
fragmented before they reach
RTS/CTS
size.
Note: Enabling the RTS Threshold causes redundant network overhead that could
negatively affect the throughput performance instead of providing a remedy.
Fragmentation Threshold
A
Fragmentation Threshold
is the maximum data fragment size (between 256 and 2432 bytes)
that can be sent in the wireless network before the AP will fragment the packet into smaller data
frames.
A large
Fragmentation Threshold
is recommended for networks not prone to interference while
you should set a smaller threshold for busy networks or networks that are prone to interference.
If the
Fragmentation Threshold
value is smaller than the
RTS/CTS
value (see previously) you
set then the RTS (Request To Send)/CTS (Clear to Send) handshake will never occur as data frames
will be fragmented before they reach
RTS/CTS
size.
Page 227 / 252
Appendix D Wireless LANs
NBG5715 User’s Guide
227
Preamble Type
Preamble is used to signal that data is coming to the receiver. Short and long refer to the length of
the synchronization field in a packet.
Short preamble increases performance as less time sending preamble means more time for sending
data. All IEEE 802.11 compliant wireless adapters support long preamble, but not all support short
preamble.
Use long preamble if you are unsure what preamble mode other wireless devices on the network
support, and to provide more reliable communications in busy wireless networks.
Use short preamble if you are sure all wireless devices on the network support it, and to provide
more efficient communications.
Use the dynamic setting to automatically use short preamble when all wireless devices on the
network support it, otherwise the NBG5715 uses long preamble.
Note: The wireless devices MUST
use the same preamble mode in order to communicate.
IEEE 802.11g Wireless LAN
IEEE 802.11g is fully compatible with the IEEE 802.11b standard. This means an IEEE 802.11b
adapter can interface directly with an IEEE 802.11g access point (and vice versa) at 11 Mbps or
lower depending on range. IEEE 802.11g has several intermediate rate steps between the
maximum and minimum data rates. The IEEE 802.11g data rate and modulation are as follows:
Wireless Security Overview
Wireless security is vital to your network to protect wireless communication between wireless
clients, access points and the wired network.
Wireless security methods available on the NBG5715 are data encryption, wireless client
authentication, restricting access by device MAC address and hiding the NBG5715 identity.
Table 85
IEEE 802.11g
DATA RATE (MBPS)
MODULATION
1
DBPSK (Differential Binary Phase Shift Keyed)
2
DQPSK (Differential Quadrature Phase Shift Keying)
5.5 / 11
CCK (Complementary Code Keying)
6/9/12/18/24/36/48/
54
OFDM (Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing)
Page 228 / 252
Appendix D Wireless LANs
NBG5715 User’s Guide
228
The following figure shows the relative effectiveness of these wireless security methods available on
your NBG5715.
Note: You must enable the same wireless security settings on the NBG5715 and on all
wireless clients that you want to associate with it.
IEEE 802.1x
In June 2001, the IEEE 802.1x standard was designed to extend the features of IEEE 802.11 to
support extended authentication as well as providing additional accounting and control features. It
is supported by Windows XP and a number of network devices. Some advantages of IEEE 802.1x
are:
User based identification that allows for roaming.
Support for RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial In User Service, RFC 2138, 2139) for
centralized user profile and accounting management on a network RADIUS server.
Support for EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol, RFC 2486) that allows additional
authentication methods to be deployed with no changes to the access point or the wireless
clients.
RADIUS
RADIUS is based on a client-server model that supports authentication, authorization and
accounting. The access point is the client and the server is the RADIUS server. The RADIUS server
handles the following tasks:
• Authentication
Determines the identity of the users.
• Authorization
Determines the network services available to authenticated users once they are connected to the
network.
• Accounting
Keeps track of the client’s network activity.
Table 86
Wireless Security Levels
SECURITY
LEVEL
SECURITY TYPE
Least
Secure
Most Secure
Unique SSID (Default)
Unique SSID with Hide SSID Enabled
MAC Address Filtering
WEP Encryption
IEEE802.1x EAP with RADIUS Server Authentication
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)
WPA2
Page 229 / 252
Appendix D Wireless LANs
NBG5715 User’s Guide
229
RADIUS is a simple package exchange in which your AP acts as a message relay between the
wireless client and the network RADIUS server.
Types of RADIUS Messages
The following types of RADIUS messages are exchanged between the access point and the RADIUS
server for user authentication:
• Access-Request
Sent by an access point requesting authentication.
• Access-Reject
Sent by a RADIUS server rejecting access.
• Access-Accept
Sent by a RADIUS server allowing access.
• Access-Challenge
Sent by a RADIUS server requesting more information in order to allow access. The access point
sends a proper response from the user and then sends another Access-Request message.
The following types of RADIUS messages are exchanged between the access point and the RADIUS
server for user accounting:
• Accounting-Request
Sent by the access point requesting accounting.
• Accounting-Response
Sent by the RADIUS server to indicate that it has started or stopped accounting.
In order to ensure network security, the access point and the RADIUS server use a shared secret
key, which is a password, they both know. The key is not sent over the network. In addition to the
shared key, password information exchanged is also encrypted to protect the network from
unauthorized access.
Types of EAP Authentication
This section discusses some popular authentication types: EAP-MD5, EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS, PEAP and
LEAP. Your wireless LAN device may not support all authentication types.
EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) is an authentication protocol that runs on top of the IEEE
802.1x transport mechanism in order to support multiple types of user authentication. By using EAP
to interact with an EAP-compatible RADIUS server, an access point helps a wireless station and a
RADIUS server perform authentication.
The type of authentication you use depends on the RADIUS server and an intermediary AP(s) that
supports IEEE 802.1x. .
For EAP-TLS authentication type, you must first have a wired connection to the network and obtain
the certificate(s) from a certificate authority (CA). A certificate (also called digital IDs) can be used
to authenticate users and a CA issues certificates and guarantees the identity of each certificate
owner.
Page 230 / 252
Appendix D Wireless LANs
NBG5715 User’s Guide
230
EAP-MD5 (Message-Digest Algorithm 5)
MD5 authentication is the simplest one-way authentication method. The authentication server
sends a challenge to the wireless client. The wireless client ‘proves’ that it knows the password by
encrypting the password with the challenge and sends back the information. Password is not sent in
plain text.
However, MD5 authentication has some weaknesses. Since the authentication server needs to get
the plaintext passwords, the passwords must be stored. Thus someone other than the
authentication server may access the password file. In addition, it is possible to impersonate an
authentication server as MD5 authentication method does not perform mutual authentication.
Finally, MD5 authentication method does not support data encryption with dynamic session key. You
must configure WEP encryption keys for data encryption.
EAP-TLS (Transport Layer Security)
With EAP-TLS, digital certifications are needed by both the server and the wireless clients for
mutual authentication. The server presents a certificate to the client. After validating the identity of
the server, the client sends a different certificate to the server. The exchange of certificates is done
in the open before a secured tunnel is created. This makes user identity vulnerable to passive
attacks. A digital certificate is an electronic ID card that authenticates the sender’s identity.
However, to implement EAP-TLS, you need a Certificate Authority (CA) to handle certificates, which
imposes a management overhead.
EAP-TTLS (Tunneled Transport Layer Service)
EAP-TTLS is an extension of the EAP-TLS authentication that uses certificates for only the server-
side authentications to establish a secure connection. Client authentication is then done by sending
username and password through the secure connection, thus client identity is protected. For client
authentication, EAP-TTLS supports EAP methods and legacy authentication methods such as PAP,
CHAP, MS-CHAP and MS-CHAP v2.
PEAP (Protected EAP)
Like EAP-TTLS, server-side certificate authentication is used to establish a secure connection, then
use simple username and password methods through the secured connection to authenticate the
clients, thus hiding client identity. However, PEAP only supports EAP methods, such as EAP-MD5,
EAP-MSCHAPv2 and EAP-GTC (EAP-Generic Token Card), for client authentication. EAP-GTC is
implemented only by Cisco.
LEAP
LEAP (Lightweight Extensible Authentication Protocol) is a Cisco implementation of IEEE 802.1x.
Dynamic WEP Key Exchange
The AP maps a unique key that is generated with the RADIUS server. This key expires when the
wireless connection times out, disconnects or reauthentication times out. A new WEP key is
generated each time reauthentication is performed.

Rate

4 / 5 based on 1 vote.

Bookmark Our Site

Press Ctrl + D to add this site to your favorites!

Share
Top